Strategic Procurement, Openness and Market Structure by Maria Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine



























Department of Economics 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone +44 (0)1483 689380 
Facsimile +44 (0)1483 689548 
Web www.econ.surrey.ac.uk 
 
STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT, OPENNESS  




(University of Kent) 
& 
Paul Levine 











We examine strategic procurement behaviour by governments and its eﬀect on
market structure in sectors, such as defence, where the government is the dominant
consumer. In a world economy with trade between producers, and between producers
and non-producers, we use a modiﬁed Dixit-Stiglitz utility function with an indepen-
dent taste for variety. Governments can, in eﬀect, choose the number of domestic
ﬁrms and their size by adjusting the procurement price. Unlike the standard model
with no independent taste for variety and no external sector of non-producers, there
are incentives for subsidies, openness impacts on industrial structure and there are
potential gains from procurement coordination between producer countries.
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Government procurement constitutes an important share of a typical country’s GDP (up
to 20% in some cases). In some industries, domestic government procurement is also the
most important source of sales and this is clearly the case in the defence and pharma-
ceutical industries. Governments have traditionally used government procurement as a
policy tool to promote ‘strategic’ domestic industries. As the World Trade Organization
(WTO) expands the restrictions over traditional protectionist trade policies, procurement
practices can be used as a less obvious trade policy tool; the government’s preference for
maintaining a domestic provider base within ‘sensitive industries’ can provide an interna-
tional justiﬁcation for maintaining such practices. However, the recognition of discrimi-
natory procurement policies as a protectionist tool has led the WTO to gather support
for a multilateral agreement to eliminate preferential treatment to national suppliers in
procurement deals.
The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is a multilateral WTO agreement
with 25 members at present.1 This Agreement was negotiated in the Uruguay Round and
took eﬀect on 1 January 1996. The GPA precludes countries from using domestic supplier
preferential treatment to achieve goals such as promotion of local industrial sectors or
business groups. Parties to the GPA are required to give products, services and suppliers
of any other Party to the Agreement treatment no less favourable than that they give to
their domestic products, services and suppliers of other parties to the Agreement. (Article
III:1). However, article XXIII of the GPA speciﬁes the exceptions to the Agreement, which
include procurement indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes.
The pharmaceutical industry is also seen by producer countries as a ‘strategic’ industry,
with government regulations openly having as an objective the maintenance of a domestic
producer base (see e.g., Kyle (2003)).
Our paper aims to capture the main features of international procurement in de-
fence and pharmaceutical industries where governments are the most important domestic
clients.2 Consequently, government procurement policies can have an impact on the struc-
1See www.wto.org for information on the GPA.
2Another relevant sector where the government can inﬂuence market structure through the procurement
process is the media sector where it may believe there to be important externalities associated with public
service broadcasting or press freedom.
1ture of these industries and this relationship is the focus of the paper. According to Kyle
(2003), in many producer countries, the price for prescribed drugs to be paid by domes-
tic health authorities is set high enough to support the local pharmaceutical industry,
which is a big employer and important export earner. The defence industry is an even
clearer example of domestic ﬁrms survival directly depending on government purchasing
commitments (see Dunne et al. (2002)).
In order to examine this link between international procurement and market structure
we construct a model of strategic public procurement and international trade. There
are both producer and non-producer countries. Governments in producer countries buy
products from the domestic ﬁrms and also import from the rest of the world, governments
in non-producer countries cover their public procurement needs through imports.
In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model of trade only involving
producers, the procurement price turns out to be the world market price, the bias for
domestic rather than imported procured goods, the inverse of ‘openness’ in our terminol-
ogy, has no eﬀect on market structure and the non-cooperative procurement equilibrium
is eﬃcient. As a result of two features of our model, these results no longer hold: ﬁrst we
allow for an external market of non-producers importing goods from producers and second
we use a modiﬁed Dixit-Stiglitz utility function as in Benassy (1996) to incorporate a taste
for variety eﬀect that is independent of the elasticity of substitution.
We assume that governments endogenously choose the number of ﬁrms that compose
the domestic procurement sector by committing to a domestic procurement price that
ensures the existence of the chosen number of domestic ﬁrms3. We ﬁnd that an increase
in openness and in the relative size of the external market reduces the number of ﬁrms
in equilibrium. This result provides a theoretical explanation for the recent increases
in concentration in both the defence and the pharmaceutical industry. In the defence
industry, for the top 100 ﬁrms, Dunne et al. (2002) report falls in the inverse Herﬁndahl
index from 49 to 22, between 1990 and 1998. For the pharmaceutical industry, Matraves
(1999) reports an increase in global market shares of the top 10 pharmaceutical companies
from 25% to 31% between 1988 and 1995, also ﬁrms in ranked places from 11th to 20th
3The ability of government to commit to a procurement price for domestic ﬁrms prior to them competing
in the exports market has been extensively used as an assumption in the strategic trade and procurement
literatures.
2saw increases in their market shares (also see Kyle (2003) for more recent concentration
data). Although increased development costs may be among the factors that could be
determining such trends, our modiﬁed Dixit-Stiglitz framework shows that they may also
be explained by the increased openness of producer countries to trade and an increase in
the size of the external market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related liter-
ature. Section 3 provides the basic set-up and the sequence of moves in the procurement
game with governments and ﬁrms as players. Section 4 solves the subgame-perfect, non-
cooperative equilibrium for the case where governments, in their procurement decisions,
but not ﬁrms, in their pricing decisions, act strategically. Section 5 allows ﬁrms to act
strategically, an important eﬀect only for small ﬁrm numbers. Section 6 studies the co-
operative equilibrium and compares it with the non-cooperative equilibrium of section 4.
Section 7 provides numerical results for the equilibria with strategic pricing by ﬁrms and
Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
Our modelling of the world trade in the procurement good uses a ‘like-for-variety’ model,
ﬁrst introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and examined further by Benassy (1996). In
this paper, we allow both for the original monopolistic competition version of the model
and the strategic interactions version, later introduced by Yang and Heijdra (1993). The
impact of trade and industrial policies on ﬁrm numbers across countries has also been
considered within the trade literature (see e.g. Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Venables
(1987)). One such policy, the procurement decision, has received special attention in this
literature.
Our research is mostly linked to a branch4 of the procurement and trade literature
4A second branch of the procurement literature focuses on the interaction between ﬁrms and procurer
in a environment characterized by the existence of asymmetric information (examples of that literature are
McAfee and McMillan (1989), Anton and Yao (1992), Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), Branco (1994), McGuire
and M.H. (1995) and Vagstad (1995)). Our paper abstracts from such issues. A third strand analyzes
the interaction between domestic defence procurement and ﬁrm competition for international arms trade
(see e.g., Levine and Smith (2000), Garcia-Alonso (1999, 2000) and Levine et al. (2000)). However, this
literature does not analyze the impact of government policies on concentration.
3starting with Baldwin (1970). This literature studies the impact of unilaterally home
biased procurement on the patterns of international specialization. Baldwin (1970, 1984)
show that a unilateral home bias in favour of domestic producers is inconsequential to
the patterns of specialization under the assumption of perfect competition. Later papers
prove that this neutrality result does not necessarily hold with imperfect competition.
Brulhart and Trionfetti (2001) prove that if a country has a unilateral home bias towards
a domestic monopolistic sector, it will also have more ﬁrms in that sector relative to the
other country (see e.g. Miyagiwa (1991) for impact on trade volumes). In our paper, we
prove that, in the presence of bilateral home bias, a symmetric increase in home bias will
increase ﬁrm numbers across the world, which is in accordance with that result.
Our framework diﬀers from this literature in a number of respects. First we restrict
ourselves to the case where all national and international demand comes from governments
and there is no private demand. Consistently with this, governments actually set domestic
prices so as to allow whichever number of ﬁrms they would like to keep to survive. Our
procurement expenditure, as far as ﬁrms decisions are concerned, is then given to ﬁrms and
inﬂuences their actions through its impact on ﬁrm numbers. Second we allow for both
strategic procurement decisions by government and strategic pricing by ﬁrms. Third,
we introduce an independent like-for-variety element, as in Benassy (1996), and a trade
structure that allows for two way trade between producers and one way trade towards
non-producers. The independent like-for-variety element and the external market of non-
producers drive our non-neutrality result of home bias on ﬁrm numbers. Finally unlike




We model an international market for a public service good, consisting of ℓ producing
and importing countries and r non-producers who only import. The total budget in each
country available for this particular public service good is given.5 Producer country 1
5A constant share of GDP is devoted to defence or health can be defended as a realistic assumption,
but as is typical in the literature we can start with a national welfare function of the form U = U(C,C0)
4produces diﬀerentiated goods j = 1,2,     ,n1, country 2 produces goods j = n1 + 1,n1 +
2,     ,n1 + n2 etc, so there are
 ℓ
i=1 ni = N, say, goods in total. Governments procure
from domestic ﬁrms (if they exist) and overseas ﬁrms who enter or exit the market freely.
It makes for a simpler presentation if we focus on decisions in producer country 1.
Government 1 procures d1j,j = 1,2,     ,n1 domestically produced goods and m1j,j =
n1+1,n1+2,  ,N imported goods. The government utility takes the form of a generalized














; α ∈ [0,1), ν > 0
(1)
In (1) the weights w1 and 1−w1, with w1 ∈ [1
2,1], express the bias for domestic rather than
imported procurement in country 1. When w1 = 1 there is autarky between producers and
1−w1 is a measure of openness in our set-up.6 If we put ν = 0 and w1 = 1
2, (1) reduces to
the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz utility function used in the new trade and endogenous growth
literatures. But as Benassy (1996) points out, this form of utility is restricted in that it
implies an on-to-one correspondence between the taste for variety and the elasticity of
substitution.
To see the signiﬁcance of this generalized form of the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function,
suppose there are two producer countries. Deﬁne a function v1(n1,n2) to represent the
proportional capability gain from spreading a certain amount of output y say between all
n1 + n2 varieties rather than concentrating a proportion w1 on one variety in country 1
where C is Dixit-Stiglitz index representing the output of a public service obtained from diﬀerentiated
inputs ((1) below) and C0 is a numeraire good which in this context is remaining consumption. If the
sector in question is defence then C would be military security; if the sector is pharmaceuticals, then C
would be public health. If the utility is Cobb-Douglas (a standard assumption) then the expenditure on
the public service is constant and the model reduces to the one in this paper.















α is the fraction of the original
good that actually arrives, the rest ‘melting away’ on route.
5and a proportion 1 − w1 on one imported variety. i.e.,
v1(n1,n2) =











[w1n1 + (1 − w1)n2]ν+ 1
α
n1 + n2
Suppose that the total number of varieties N = n1 +n2 increases, keeping the proportion
n1
n2 ﬁxed. Then putting n1 = kN and n2 = (1 − k)N, v1 = v1(N) = [w1k + (1 − w1)(1 −
k)]( 1
α+ν)N(ν+ 1
α−1). We now deﬁne the taste for variety by the elasticity Ndv1









The signiﬁcance of the extra term in (1) is now apparent. If ν = 0, then the taste for variety
τ = 1
α − 1 = 1
σ−1 which is determined solely by the elasticity of substitution σ = 1
1−α.
Thus this formulation establishes an arbitrary link between diﬀerent characteristics: taste
for variety and elasticity of substitution, the latter, as we shall see, also determining the
market power. Introducing the extra term breaks this link and has important consequences
for the subsequent analysis.
Governments in producer countries procure from domestic and foreign ﬁrms, possibly
at diﬀerent prices. Let p1j be the price of the procured domestic good and Pj be the world
market price of the traded good of variety j produced by ﬁrms in all producing countries






Pjm1j = G1 (2)
where Gi is total procurement expenditure in country i.












and their budget constraint is:
N  
j=1
Pjmij = Gi (4)
The model is completed by specifying the following cost structure for the ﬁrm. Firm
j in producer country 1 produces d1j units of variety j for its domestic government at a
6procurement price p1j and exports x1j units at a international market price Pj. The cost
of producing total output y1j = d1j + x1j is assumed to be
C(y1j) = F + cy1j (5)
The ﬁrst term in (5) we associate with ﬁxed capital costs and R&D, and the ﬁnal term
constitutes variable costs. It follows that the proﬁt of this ﬁrm is
π1j = p1jd1j + Pjx1j − C(y1j) (6)
and since there is free entry and exit, we must impose the participation constraint π1j ≥ 0
on the procurement decision.
3.2 Sequencing of Events
We ﬁrst consider the optimal decisions of a single government taking the decisions of other
governments as given. The sequencing of events is as follows:
1. Domestic Procurement by Producers. Given total procurement expenditure, the
government in producer country 1 procures domestic goods of quantity d1j at price p1j,
for j = 1,2,     ,n1. It also formulates a time-consistent plan to import goods m1j, for
j = n1 + 1,n1 + 2,     ,N at the world market equilibrium price Pj. All decisions are
subject to a budget constraint and a non-negative proﬁt participation constraint for do-
mestic ﬁrms. The procurement price may be greater or less than the international market
price. Firms already participating in the international market will always accept domestic
procurement as long as the procurement price exceeds the marginal cost. In general, the
world market price can depend on procurement decisions at this stage, but for large N
(assumed in the ﬁrst part of the paper) we have monopolistic competition with the price
(set in stage 2 below) given by Pj = P = c
α which depends only on the marginal cost c
and the elasticity parameter α.
2. The Price-Setting Equilibrium. With a commitment to producing d1j, in a price-
setting equilibrium of this stage of the game, ﬁrms in producer country 1 set world prices
Pj and export quantity x1j to countries i = 2,     ,ℓ + r.
3. Military Spending by Non-Producers and Demand for Imports by all Coun-
tries. Given the world market price Pj, and military expenditure, governments in both
7producer and non-producer countries i = 1,2,     ,ℓ + r procure imports of good, mij,
j = 1,2,     ,N, where i  = j for producer countries i = 1,2,     ,ℓ.
4 Monopolistic Competition
In this section we develop the non-cooperative equilibrium for the case where the number
of ﬁrms is large and therefore we can ignore strategic pricing behaviour. To solve for the
equilibrium7 we proceed by backward induction starting at stage 3.
4.1 The Imports Decision at Stage 3
At stage 3, given the price Pj, and the number of diﬀerentiated goods, the importing
government in non-producing producer country i chooses mij to maximize U1 given by (1)
subject to its budget constraint (2) where the procurement element is given. To carry out























ij = λPj ; j = 1,2,     N (7)






















j mij = Gi
where σ = 1
1−α > 1. This results in the demand by government i = ℓ + 1,ℓ + 2,     ,ℓ + r









7Note that in the absence of procurement considerations the trade equilibrium corresponds exactly to
a standard trade model, for example in Krugman (1979). Then stage 1 of our model is the free-entry
process.






Then ˆ P = ˜ P
1
1−σ is the familiar price index of imported goods facing each non-producer
country used in the product diﬀerentiation literature (see, for example, Beath and Kat-




j ˆ P1−σ (10)
The importance of (10) is that given ˆ P, the elasticity of demand for variety j on the world
market with respect to price is constant with elasticity −σ.
For any producer country i = 1,2,     ,ℓ import demand for any good j = 1,2,     ,N










; j  = Ni−1 + 1, Ni−1 + 2,     ,Ni−1 + ni
= 0; j = Ni−1 + 1, Ni−1 + 2,     ,Ni−1 + ni (11)
where we have deﬁned Ni = n1+n2+   +ni for i ≥ 1 (in which case N1 = n1 and Nℓ = N)).
Thus country i = 1,2,  ,ℓ produces varieties j = Ni−1+1,Ni−1+2,   ,Ni−1+ni = Ni and
imports mij units of variety j = 1,2,   ,Ni−1,Ni+1,Ni+2,    ,N (deﬁning N0 = 0). Again










k ; i = 1,2,     ,ℓ (12)
4.2 Price Setting at Stage 2
Turning to stage 2 of the game, in producer country 1 ﬁrm j = 1,2,     ,n1 proﬁt at stage
2 is given by
π1j = (p1j − c)d1j + (Pj − c)x1j − F ; j = 1,2,     ,n1 (13)



















9The ﬁrst term in (14) consists of exports to other producing countries and depends on
the procurement decisions already taken at stage 1 and on all prices set at stage 2 of the
game. The second term consists of exports to non-producing countries and depend on the
all prices set by ﬁrms at stage 2 of the game.
For producers let Γi = Gi −
 Ni−1+ni
j=Ni−1+1 pijdij be the part of the government budget
devoted to imports. Deﬁne Γi = Gi and ˜ Pi = ˜ P for non-producers. Then maximizing




















      
strategic interaction term
(16)
In working out the eﬀect of a change in the price of variety ﬁrm j considers two eﬀects: the
ﬁrst term takes the total price index of imports facing other countries ˜ Pi ; i = 2,3,   ,ℓ+r
as given. The second strategic term considers the eﬀect on each of these price indices of
the ﬁrms export price. In the ﬁrst part of this paper we assume monopolistic competition.
Then there are so many ﬁrms that we can ignore this strategic eﬀect. In the second part
of the paper we examine the small numbers case for which the strategic interaction term


















x1j = 0; j = 1,2,     ,n1 (17)
From (9) and (12) we have ∂ ˜ Pi
∂Pj = (1 − σ)P−σ
j . Hence using (14) we obtain from (17)











i Γi  ℓ+r
i=2 ˜ P−1
i Γi


















Equation (18) for i = 1,2,     ,ℓ gives ℓ equations in ℓ prices, one for each country.
10We have now set out the price equilibrium in stage 2 of the game, and in general it
can be asymmetric. In our set-up asymmetries can arise from diﬀerences in Gi and wi
8
In a symmetric equilibrium with identical producer countries, n1 = n2 =       = n and
˜ P = ℓnP1−σ for non-producers and ˜ P = (ℓ−1)nP1−σ for producers. Then with identical












   (19)
Equation (19) gives the Lerner index for the symmetrical price equilibrium in its most
general form where the world market price depends on all the procurement decisions at
stage 1 of the game. To make the model tractable we focus on two opposite cases. The
ﬁrst is where the external market of non-producers dominates on the demand side, i.e.,
rGnp >> ℓ(Gp − npd),9 a condition satisﬁed as the domestic preference parameter w










The opposite extreme to the domination of the external market is to assume it is non-










Whereas (20) is valid for ℓ = 1, (21) only holds for ℓ > 1. The reason we must exclude the
single-country case for a model of producers only is that the market at stage 3 is created
by importers and we therefore need at least two countries for a market price to exist.
For both assumptions, since σ > 1, this Lerner index L > 1
σ and is decreasing in
n. Hence compared with the standard model of monopolistic competition (i.e., without
strategic interaction by ﬁrms) the price is now higher which, in turn, encourages entry and
results in more ﬁrms in equilibrium.10 From (20) the condition for the non-strategic pricing
assumption to be a good approximation in a symmetric equilibrium whether producers or
8It is also straightforward to allow for diﬀerent marginal costs replacing c with ci in (18)








10See Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), chapter 3.
11non-producers dominate on the demand side is that




For large numbers of ﬁrms (22) will hold even for σ = 1
1−α large (i.e., α close to unity
where goods become close substitutes). Even for small numbers of ﬁrms the condition will
hold if σ approaches unity (the Cobb-Douglas case) where P → ∞. In the next subsection
we study the full equilibrium under the assumption that (22) is satisﬁed in equilibrium
so that all varieties sell at the same mark-up over marginal costs Pj = P = c
α. The
case of procurement when (22) is not satisﬁed and strategic pricing behaviour by ﬁrms is
signiﬁcant is examined in section 3.4.
4.3 The Procurement Decision at Stage 1
We now complete the equilibrium by evaluating the optimal decision of the government
in country 1 at the procurement stage 1 of the game. The government when choosing the
procurement price, p1, relaxes or tightens the ﬁrms’ participation constraint and, in eﬀect,
chooses the number of domestic ﬁrms. Imposing symmetry between identical domestic
ﬁrms d1j = d1 for all domestic varieties. Moreover, given the symmetry between all ﬁrms
in within each country i = 2,3,   ,ℓ in the international market, government 1 will choose
the same amount of imports of each variety from country i, m1i say. We examine a Nash
equilibrium of stage 1 of the game and a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game,
where for country 1, the government’s independent decision variables are d1 and n1.11
The optimization problem of the government in country 1 is to maximize utility
U1 = [w1n1 + (1 − w1)(N − n1)]ν
 
w1n1dα








with respect to independent choice variables d1 and n1, given the world prices Pi = P = c
α
of each variety from country i, the corresponding decisions of other countries, and two
11Any two from four possible decision variables, d1, m1,p1 and n1 can be assumed, but will lead to
diﬀerent Nash equilibria. Our particular choice, d1, and n1 is made partly, for analytical convenience, but
can be also justiﬁed by the need to observe decision variables in a more realistic incomplete information
setting, where the process of dynamic adjustment towards the equilibrium, for example of a Cournot-type,
needs to be addressed. It is plausible to assume that the domestic procurement decision, di, and the
number of ﬁrms supported, ni, i = 1,2,· · ·,ℓ are more readily observed that the procurement price, pi,
i = 1,2,· · ·,ℓ, which involves a possibly hidden subsidy.
12constraints. These are the budget constraint (BC1) and the representative domestic ﬁrm’s
participation constraint (PC1) given by




PC1 : π1 = (p1 − c)d1 + (P1 − c)x1 − F ≥ 0
Clearly the PC constraint must bind so the procurement price is given by
p1 = c +






where we have written export net revenue (P1 − c)x1 = R(x1). It is useful to note that
exports x1 = x1j of each home variety j can be written in terms of decision variables as
the sum of exports to other producers (x
p
1) and to non-producers (x
np

















Since we are assuming a Nash equilibrium in independent decision variables d1 and n1
we can eliminate the procurement price p1 using the PC1 constraint. The BC1 constraint
now becomes
BC1 : n1(cd1 + F − R(x1)) +
ℓ  
i=2
Pinim1i = G1 (26)
and the government now maximizes U1 given by (23) with respect to d1 and n1, given
(26), and the corresponding decision variables and constraints of other governments.12
To carry out this constrained optimization, deﬁne a Lagrangian











where λ1 ≥ 0 is a Lagrange multiplier country 1 assigns to its own budget constraint, and
 1i ≥ 0, i = 2,3,     ,ℓ are Lagrange multipliers assigned to the other countries’ budget
constraints. Then country 1 maximizes L1 with respect to independent decision variables
12Since the procurement price is eliminated it is apparent that the payment to the ﬁrm can also be
treated as a lump sum of amount p1d1.
13d1, n1, and with respect to endogenous variables {mij, λi, i}, i,j = 1,2,   ,ℓ, j  = i, given
the independent decision variables of the other countries {di, ni}, i = 2,3,     ,ℓ.
This optimization problem is greatly simpliﬁed as a result of the following Lemma:
Lemma
In a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game  1i = 0, i = 2,3,     ,ℓ.
Proof











; i > 1
(27)











∂m1i = (Pi − c). Then dividing the i = r equation by the i = s equation, the












j=2  1jnj(Pj − c)
 σ
(28)
However from (11) at stage 3 of the game, the relative demand by country 1 for two









where prices are now out of equilibrium as deﬁned in stages 2 and 1. In a SPE we must
have agreement with the anticipated decision on imports given by (28) and the actual de-
cision taken at stage 3 given by (29). This requires
 ℓ
j=2  1jnj(Pj −c) = 0. Since Pj > c
and  1i ≥ 0 it follows that  1i = 0 for all i = 2,3,     ,ℓ. ¤
If at stage 1 the governments could commit to both domestic and overseas contracts,
then imports of the later would satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition (27) with  1i > 0. Ac-
cording to (27), the marginal beneﬁt (the left-hand-side) equals the marginal budgetary
cost. The ﬁrst term of the latter, on the right-hand-side, equals the shadow price of BC1
multiplied by the procurement price. The second term equals the sum of the shadow
price of BCi ,i > 1 multiplied by the marginal revenue gain to each foreign country from
exporting to country 1. Exports to country 1 relax these budget constraints and bring
14beneﬁt to that country through allowing for more imports. Taking this into consideration
lowers the eﬀective cost of imports and therefore increases their volume.
Having made this commitment to importing more than it would in the absence of these
strategic considerations, at stage 3 country 1 has a given import budget G1 − p1n1d1. If
it were to re-optimize given world market prices, it would choose imports given by (11)
and therefore set  1i = 0; i > 1. The ex ante optimal contract at stage 1 is no longer
optimal ex post at stage 3. The equilibrium is not subgame perfect in other words. The
subgame perfection condition imposes  i = 0, i > 2 and implies that at stage 1 country 1
ignores the budget constraints of other countries. Alternatively it implies that country 1
takes exports to other producers x
p
1 as given.13
With  i = 0, i > 2, and Pi = P = c
α in the equilibrium at stage 1, the remaining ﬁrst-
order conditions for an internal solution (where n1 ≥ 0 and d1 ≥ 0 and are not binding,





1 [w1n1 + (1 − w1)(N − n1)]ανw1dα−1









1[w1n1 + (1 − w1)(N − n1)]αν + νw1U1[w1n1 + (1 − w1)(N − n1)]−1








1 [w1n1 + (1 − w1)(N − n1)]αν(1 − w1)mα−1
1 = λP (32)
These 3 equations plus the constraint BC1 solve for the decision variables n1, d1, m1j and




PN2 . Using this and dividing (31), and (32)
by (30), in turn, we can eliminate the shadow price λ to obtain
d1 =
 




















13As it turns out in equilibrium, x
p
1 which equals imports by other producers, is a linear function of
decision variables di and the equilibrium world price P. For the monopolistic competition assumption the
latter is a constant so in that case taking x
p
1 as given is valid. With strategic pricing by ﬁrms however x
p
1
depends on n1 through its eﬀect on the world price. The subgame perfect condition is then essential for
this case.












and used P = c

























completes the solution for the single economy given the decisions on di, mi and ni by the
other countries.
We now solve for a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium in which all producer coun-
tries and all non-producing countries are identical. Then wi = w, Gi = Gp say, for
producers (i = 1,2,     ,ℓ) and Gi = Gnp for non-producers ( i = ℓ + 1,ℓ + 2,     ,ℓ + r).








d = nν+ 1
α[w +(1−w)(ℓ−1)]ν[w +(1−w)(ℓ−1)φα]
1
α for producing countries. The
ﬁrst-order condition (33) now becomes
d =
(F − R + Θ1)
P(1 − α + Θ2)
(39)





αν[w + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)φα]
[w + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)]
Substituting for F − R from (39) into (24) we arrive at the procurement price in the
non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium




Hence for a ‘traditional’ Dixit-Stiglitz utility function where ν = Θ2 = 0 and in the limit
as the external market becomes small (but still of suﬃcient size to determine the world
16market price), Θ1 → 0 and we have that p = P; i.e., the procurement price equals the
market price. Generally however the procurement price can be above or below the world
market price.14 A high taste for variety ν encourages the former and whilst a large external
market encourages the latter. The intuition behind this external eﬀect is that increasing
the number of diﬀerentiated goods, each produced by a single ﬁrm, reduces the net export
revenue to the external market per ﬁrm and tightens the participation constraint. In a
non-cooperative equilibrium each government takes into account only their own contribu-
tion to the world supply of diﬀerentiated goods and, through reducing the procurement
price, lowers its optimal number of domestic ﬁrms as the external market becomes more
important. We summarize this result as:
Proposition 1: The Procurement Price
In a symmetric, non-cooperative equilibrium without strategic pricing by ﬁrms,
the procurement price may be above or below the world market price. A high
taste for variety encourages the former and a large external market encourages
the latter.
To derive the full solution to the non-cooperative equilibrium put x1 = x = (ℓ−1)φd+
rGnp













nP (1 + (ℓ − 1)φ + Θ2)
Hence we can solve for the equilibrium number of diﬀerentiated goods (equals the number
of ﬁrms), n, and hence the total world number N = ℓn. We express the following result
for N in terms of the total world expenditure G = ℓGp +rGnp and the relative size of the






















where we have deﬁned
θ =
(1 − α)(1 + (ℓ − 1)φ) + Θ2
1 + (ℓ − 1)φ + Θ2
∈ ((1 − α),1)
14As long as p > c, the ﬁrm having incurred the ﬁxed cost of entry will beneﬁt from the procurement
contract and in a free-entry equilibrium of identical ﬁrms, those relying only on the export market will
not be able to survive. Thus through the procurement process, the government can choose the number of
ﬁrms in equilibrium.
17Again the model reduces to a special case of a ‘traditional’ Dixit-Stiglitz utility function
where ν = Θ2 = Gnp = 0. Then θ = 1−α and we have that N =
G(1−α)
F , a familiar result
for a closed economy monopolistic competition model. From (41) and the deﬁnition of Θ1
given after (39) we can now examine the eﬀect on the world number of ﬁrms of changes in
the taste for variety parameter ν, the preference for domestic supply parameter w ∈ [1
2,1]
and the relative size of the external market rGnp
G . First note that θ ∈ [1 − α,1] as ν








G < 1, σ > 1 and ℓ ≥ 1 this condition is satisﬁed. Hence it follows that N is an
increasing function of ν and we arrive at the intuitive result that an increase in the taste
for variety in producer countries increases the number of diﬀerentiated goods.
Next consider an increase in w. In the range w ∈ [1
2,1], φ falls from ασ to 0 and Θ2 goes
from
αν[1+(ℓ−1)ασα]
ℓ to αν. Since αασ < 1,
1+(ℓ−1)ασα
ℓ < 1 and therefore this represents an
increase in Θ2 and therefore θ. We have already shown that N is an increasing function
of θ. It follows that as producer countries become less concerned with domestic supply,
Θ2 falls and therefore the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, N, falls.
Finally from (41), N decreases with the relative size of the external market, rGnp
G , if




(θ + ℓ − 1) (42)
Since θ < 1, the right-hand side of (42) is an increasing function of ℓ and at ℓ = ∞ equals
1
σ. But θ > 1 − α. Hence (42) holds.
A willingness to procure from abroad, ‘ openness’ in our terminology, and the growing
relative size of the international market of non-producers as production becomes more
concentrated are two features one may associate with globalization. In that sense we may
conclude that our results suggest that globalization is associated with a decrease in the
number of ﬁrms in the world market. Summarizing our results:
Proposition 2: The Number of Firms
In a symmetric, non-cooperative equilibrium without strategic pricing by ﬁrms,
the number of ﬁrms increases as the taste for variety by producer countries
increases. An increase in openness, in the form of a reduction in preferences
of producer countries for domestic supply, and an increase in the relative size
of the external market results in a decrease in the number of ﬁrms.
185 Strategic Pricing by Firms
In our previous calculations, at stage 1 the governments either were, in eﬀect, price-takers
in the world market because the world price Pj = c
α was independent of the decisions taken
at that stage, or they were constrained to procure at the world market price. In fact in the
Bertrand equilibrium described by (18) the equilibrium price depends on decisions made
at stage 1. A symmetric strategic equilibrium is at least partially tractable if we conﬁne
ourselves the the case where the demand for imports by producers is small compared







Then P1 = P2 =       = P. Furthermore, in a symmetric equilibrium, country 1 does not
distinguish between the remaining counties and assumes n2 = n3 =       = nℓ = n, say.
Therefore it sees the eﬀect of its own procurement decision on the world market price
(obtained from (20)) through the relationship:
P =
[Nσ + 1 − σ]c
[N − 1](σ − 1)
=
[(n1 + (ℓ − 1)n)σ + 1 − σ]c
[(n1 + (ℓ − 1)n) − 1](σ − 1)
(43)
which introduces new terms into the ﬁrst-order condition (31). Now with strategic pro-









1[w1n1 + (1 − w1)(N − n1]αν + νw1U1[w1n1 + (1 − w1)(N − n1]−1
= λ
 
cd1 + F − R(x1) − n1
∂R1
∂n1





whilst (30) and (27) remain as before, as does the relationship
m1 = φ1d1 (45)
where


































19The left-hand-side of (48) is the marginal beneﬁt to utility from a marginal increase in the
number of ﬁrms. The right-hand-side is the marginal budgetary cost. In the absence of
the second and third strategic procurement terms this marginal cost is simply the shadow
price of the BC (λ) multiplied by the cost of the procurement from the marginal ﬁrm. The
strategic terms reduce this budgetary cost by raising export revenue (the second term) and
reducing the cost of imports through lowering P, the third term.
The PC1 and the BC1 conditions:




G1 = p1n1d1 + (ℓ − 1)nPm1 (50)
complete the formulation of the ﬁrst order conditions for country 1 given the decisions of
the remaining symmetrical countries.
We now calculate the symmetric equilibrium for ℓ identical countries making the same
strategic procurement decisions as country 1. First, partially diﬀerentiate R1 = (P1−c)x1
keeping mi and ni, i = 2,3,     ,ℓ (the decision variables of the other countries) ﬁxed to










































where xp = (ℓ − 1)φd and xnp = rGn
NP are exports per ﬁrm to other producing and non-
producing countries respectively. To complete the solution of the symmetric equilibrium





(N − 1)2(σ − 1)
(52)
In a symmetric equilibrium terms involving exports to other producers on the right-










since internal trade within the producers must balance. The ﬁrst-order condition (39) now
becomes
d =
(F − R + Θ1 + Θ3)







αν[w + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)φα]











(N − 1)(1 + (N − 1)σ)
Again substituting for F − R from (53) into (24) we arrive at the procurement price in
the non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium with strategic pricing by ﬁrms:




Compared with (40) there is now a new term in Θ3 in the procurement price equation.
This has the eﬀect of strengthening the ‘external market’ eﬀect referred to in proposition 1.
Whereas strategic pricing has the eﬀect of increasing the world market price P, the desire to
extract more revenue from the external export sector sees producers lowering ﬁrm numbers
further by lowering the procurement price relative to P. Hence the new proposition:
Proposition 3: The Procurement Price with Strategic Pricing
In a symmetric, non-cooperative equilibrium with strategic pricing by ﬁrms,
the procurement price again may be above or below the world market price.
A high taste for variety encourages the former and a large external market
encourages the latter. Strategic pricing by ﬁrms enhances the external market
eﬀect and further lowers the procurement price relative to the market price.
The extra strategic pricing term involves a term in 1
(nℓ−1)(1+(nℓ−1)σ) and the price P is
now longer ﬁxed at stage 1, but now depends on n. These changes precludes an analytical
solution for the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and for the rest of the equilibrium. We
therefore turn to numerical solutions. Before doing this however it is useful to compare
the non-cooperative equilibrium with a benchmark optimum. In the next section we solve
for the optimum for the producers which they would reach if they were to cooperate over
procurement decisions at stage 1 of the game.
6 Cooperation Between Producers
In a symmetric cooperative agreement at stage 1, ℓ identical producers would choose
d1 = d2 =       = dℓ = d, n1 = n2 =       = nℓ = n and m1 = m2 =       = mℓ = m to
21maximize U1 = U2 =       = Uℓ = U where
U = [w + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)]nν+ 1
α[wdα + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)mα]
1
α (55)
subject to budget constraints BC1 = BC2 =      ,= BC and participation constraints
PC1 = PC2 =       = PC where
BC : n[pd + P(ℓ − 1)m] = Gp
PC : π = (p − c)d + R(x) − F = 0
In PC the net revenue is given by
R(x) = (P − c)x = (P − c)(xp + xnp) = (P − c)
 











and the external market dominates on
the supply side, the price is given by the Lerner index








Using (56) we can consolidate the BC and PC constraints as




Hence the optimal procurement decision for the producers together is found by maximizing
nν+ 1
α[wdα + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)mα]
1
α with respect to n, d and m subject to the consolidated
constraint (58).
To carry out this optimization deﬁne a Lagrangian
nν+ 1









where λ ≥ 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:












d : n(ν+ 1
α)[wdα + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)mα]
1
α−1wdα−1 = λnc
m : n(ν+ 1
α)[wdα + (1 − w)(ℓ − 1)mα]
1
α−1(1 − w)(ℓ − 1)mα−1 = λnc(ℓ − 1)






























Equations (59), (60), (61) together with the constraint (58) characterize the optimal co-
operative procurement agreement.














1−α (ℓ − 1)
 
= w[1 + ¯ φ(ℓ − 1)]. Then substituting
into (60), a little algebra results in
N =














An interesting result follows from (62). The right-hand-side is a decreasing function of n
and is independent of the domestic production bias parameter, w. Therefore the solution,
given by the ﬁxed point of this function, is unique and is independent of w. Since imports
m = ¯ φd where ¯ φ = 1−w
w , an increase in w has no eﬀect on the total number of ﬁrms
(varieties) in the cooperative arrangement and only aﬀects the trade between producers.15
Note that this contrasts with the non-cooperative arrangement where an decrease in w
leads to a decrease in the total number of ﬁrms (see proposition 2). As with the non-
cooperative equilibrium, however, since L(n) < 1, from (62) we can see that an increase
in the relative size of the external market leads to a lower total number of ﬁrms under
cooperative, and comparing (62) with (41), cooperation enhances this ‘external eﬀect’ on
the total ﬁrm number. To summarize:
Proposition 4: Optimal Cooperative Procurement
In the optimal cooperative procurement arrangement, the total number of
ﬁrms is independent of the preferences of producer countries for domestic
supply. As with the non-cooperative equilibrium, an increase in the relative
size of the external market leads to a lower total number of ﬁrms under co-
operation. The eﬀect of strategic pricing by ﬁrms is to lower the number of
ﬁrms chosen by governments in the procurement process.
15Compare the trade equation in the non-cooperative equilibrium, where m = φd and φ =
c(1−w)
Pw . With
cooperation, trade is valued not at the world market price, but at the marginal cost, resulting in more
trade.
236.1 Comparison of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Equilibria
Denote the ﬁrm number per country in the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
given by (62) and (41), divided by ℓ, by nC and nNC respectively. We can derive analytical
results for the diﬀerence nC−nNC for the large ﬁrm numbers case without strategic pricing
(where L = 1
σ and therefore L′(n) = 0) given by (41). First, putting ℓ = 1 in the latter
expression we ﬁnd, as expected, that nC = nNC; i.e., the non-cooperative equilibrium and
the cooperative arrangement are the same if there is only one country.
Now suppose that there is no external market. Putting r = 0 in (62) and (41) a little
algebra shows that nC ≥> nNC for ν ≥ 0. In the case of ν = r = 0 and monopolistic com-
petition we arrive at the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz result that the non-cooperative equilibrium
is eﬃcient and therefore there are no gains from cooperation in the procurement decision.
If ν > 0 but there is no external market the non-cooperative equilibrium is ineﬃcient:
each country fails to internalize external beneﬁt to other countries from producing variety
and result is that too few varieties are produced.
We can analyze the case where there is an external market but the Dixit-Stiglitz utility
function is conventional (ν = 0). Then it is straightforward to show the opposite is true:
nC < nNC. Now the non-cooperative equilibrium is again ineﬃcient but this time there
are too many varieties produced compared with the eﬃcient cooperative equilibrium. The
reason for this is that given total demand is ﬁxed, competition for the external market sees
revenue from external exports per ﬁrm rise as the total number of ﬁrms falls. This occurs
because ﬁrms then compete less intensively and can spread their ﬁxed costs over a larger
market share. Under non-cooperation, governments in choosing ﬁrm numbers choose to
have more ﬁrms compared with the optimum because governments acting independently
can only aﬀect competition between their own domestic ﬁrms. We can summarize our
results as follows:
Proposition 5. Comparison of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative equilibria
under Monopolistic Competition.
Comparing the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria without strategic
pricing by ﬁrms, with no external market, taste for variety (ν > 0) results in
too few ﬁrms in the non-cooperative equilibrium. If ν = 0 competition is the
external market results in too many ﬁrms in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
247 Numerical Results for the Strategic Pricing Case
We now turn to numerical solutions of the complete equilibrium with strategic procure-
ment by governments and strategic pricing by ﬁrms (the small N = nℓ case. We choose
parameter values ν = c = 1, α = 0.5 and ℓ = 3. We use as a baseline model the case
where N is large, utility is given by the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz CES function with ν = 0
and there is no external market of non-producers. Then in both the non-cooperative and
cooperative cases we have that N =
(1−α)G
F . We normalize total world expenditure G = 1





In our ﬁrst experiment we ﬁx the proportion of world demand from non-producers,
rGn
G = Φ, say, at Φ = 0.5 and allow the domestic procurement bias parameter, w to
increase from w = 0.5 to w = 1 at which point producing countries are self-suﬃcient,
and only exporting to non-producers. In our second experiment we ﬁx the preference
parameter at w = 0.75, so there is some domestic bias in the procurement decision, and
we allow Φ to increase from Φ = 0.5 towards unity.













rGnp against w. At w = 1, there is no internal market, Ξ = 0, and the model
involves no approximation. As w decreases Ξ increases to Ξ = at w = 0.5 and clearly
the missing internal market demand eﬀects are important. For w ≥ 0.75, we can be
conﬁdent that the approximation adopted for the pricing behaviour is valid. In ﬁgure 2
with w = 0.75 we see that the condition Ξ << 1 is easily satisﬁed for higher values of Φ.
7.1 Changes in Domestic Procurement Bias
In ﬁgure 3 the number of ﬁrms per country in the non-cooperative equilibrium rises with w,
the reverse of our ﬁrst characteristic of increasing openness in proposition 2. As countries
become more self-suﬃcient they internalize the beneﬁts of variety arising from ν > 0 and
choose to support more domestic ﬁrms. Under cooperation ﬁrm number is independent of
w as predicted by proposition 4. Figure 3 (and ﬁgure 7 below) demonstrates the down-
ward eﬀect of strategic pricing on the choice of ﬁrm numbers by including graphs where the
governments ignore their inﬂuence on the price. Figure 4 shows that the non-cooperative
25procurement price exceeds the world market price, indicating a subsidy through the pro-
curement process, and this subsidy increases as countries become more self-suﬃcient. From
proposition 3 there are two eﬀects at work here: taste for variety ν > 0 tends to encourage
subsidy whilst the external market eﬀect encourages the opposite (a tax on export proﬁts).
With our parameter values in the non-cooperative equilibrium the former eﬀect dominates
and increases as w increases. In the cooperative arrangement the opposite happens and
the procurement price involves a tax on export proﬁts.
Figure 5 shows total output per ﬁrm in the non-cooperative equilibrium broken down
into exports to non-producers and producers and domestic procurement. As w increases
exports to producers fall and initially output is diverted to domestic procurement. With
the increase in the number of ﬁrms, the total size of each ﬁrm falls and all three components
eventually fall for higher values of w. Finally the utility loss to producers from failing to
cooperate are shown in ﬁgure 6.16 Considering the welfare of producers only, there are
‘too many’ ﬁrms and they are ‘too small’. This excessive competition is worsened as
ﬁrms become more self-suﬃcient, but the welfare loss diminishes because the fall in size is
outweighed by an increase in variety as w increases.
7.2 Changes in the Composition of World Demand
We now ﬁx the preference parameter at w = 0.75, so there is some domestic bias in the
procurement decision, and we allow the proportion of world demand from non-producers
to increase from Φ = 0.5 towards unity. Total world expenditure stays at unity. Figure 7
shows the subsequent rise in ﬁrm numbers under both non-cooperation and cooperation
as Φ rises. As the external market increases, the excessive number of ﬁrms from the
viewpoint of the producers becomes more pronounced. From ﬁgure 8 these changes in
market structure are brought about by initially a subsidy under non-cooperative giving
way to a tax at higher values of Φ. The optimal procurement price for the producers, by
contrast, involves a substantial tax throughout the full range of Φ. All these results are
consistent with the results of propositions 1 to 4.
A falling number of ﬁrms as Φ rises is associated with a rise in the size of each ﬁrm.
16Let U
C and U




26Figure 9 shows this happening and a switch of output from domestic procurement and
internal trade to the external market. Finally ﬁgure 10 shows that the gains to cooperation
between producers rise substantially as the external market becomes more important.
7.3 The Integer Problem
There is clearly an integer problem of how to interpret ﬁrm numbers that are not integers.
This sub-section addresses this problem. Suppose we take the parameter values w = 0.5
and Φ = 0.7 which results in a strategic pricing non-cooperative equilibrium number of
ﬁrms n = 3.036. We can interpret this value as the expected number of ﬁrms in a stochastic
environment when the government commits to a procurement price and quantity at the
beginning of the game. The sequencing of events is now:
1. Government 1 carries out an approximate, certainty equivalent optimization17by choos-
ing the procurement price and quantity on the basis of expected parameter values E(c),
E(F) on the supply side and E(G
p
i), i = 2,3,   ,ℓ, E(Gn
i ), i = ℓ+1,ℓ+2,   ,ℓ+r, E(w)
and E(α) on the demand side. The average expenditure E(Gp) is ﬁxed.
2. Stochastic values of these parameters are realized.
3. Firms enter as long as the PC constraint πi ≥ 0 is satisﬁed.
4. Given an integral number of ﬁrms, they compete over prices .
5. Given the international price, governments choose imported procurement quantities.
Actual producer expenditure Gp is realized.
Figures 11 and 12 show the results when only ﬁxed costs are allowed to change. We
have assumed a uniform distribution for F with support [0.7E(F), 1.3E(F)]. The meaning
of n = 3.036 is now clear from ﬁgure 11: in choosing this number through the appropriate
procurement price, the governments is choosing n = 2 with probability 108/200 = 0.54,
n = 3 with probability 71/200 = 0.355 and n = 4 with probability 1−0.54−0.355 = 0.105.
This gives E(n) = 2.565 compared with the interpretation of our optimally chosen ﬁrm
number as E(n) = 3.036. The reason for this discrepancy is that when discretizing the
17Certainty equivalent behaviour is optimal for a quadratic utility function and a linear model environ-
ment. It follows that if we linearize the model environment and approximate the utility function by a
quadratic Taylor series in the vicinity of the deterministic optimal solution, then the certainty equivalence
approximation is accurate for suﬃciently small shocks.
27ﬁrm number we always round down and never up. On average the optimization treating
n as continuous will result in a continuous n that is rounded down by anything between 0
and 1, i.e., by 0.5 on average.18 Subtracting 0.5 from n = 3.036 gives n = 2.536 and our
theoretical result and Monte Carlo results are now in remarkably close agreement. Figure
12 shows how the international market price changes around the expected value P = 2.123
as ﬁrm numbers change.
8 Conclusions
This paper has explored the strategic procurement behaviour by governments who can,
in eﬀect, choose the number of ﬁrms and their size by adjusting the procurement price.
In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model with no external market of
non-producers the procurement price turns out to be the world market price, openness
has no eﬀect on market structure and the non-cooperative equilibrium is eﬃcient. With
an external market and a modiﬁed Dixit-Stiglitz utility function to incorporate a taste for
variety eﬀect, this is no longer the case. The latter generates an incentive to subsidize
and the non-cooperative equilibrium is ineﬃcient with too few ﬁrms. The external market
has the opposite eﬀect on ﬁrm numbers. Now governments have an incentive to reduce
ﬁxed costs and cut back on the number of varieties that are produced since collectively
variety number incurs no beneﬁt in the external market. Acting individually countries
will be deterred from reducing varieties produced and exported because of the loss of
market share in the external sector. Acting collectively there is no such inhibition and
then ﬁrm numbers will be cut further. With strategic pricing by ﬁrms this raises the price
countries receive from the external market and the incentive to reduce the number of ﬁrms
is strengthened.
In a symmetric, non-cooperative equilibrium, the number of ﬁrms is inﬂuenced by a
number of factors. We show how the number of ﬁrms increases as the taste for variety
by producer countries increases. In addition, an increase in openness, in the form of a
reduction in preferences of producer countries for domestic supply, and an increase in
the relative size of the external market results in a decrease in the number of ﬁrms and
therefore an increase in concentration. Under cooperative procurement though, symmetric
18This suggests we should modify the optimizations treating n as continuous by replacing n with n−0.5.
28changes in home bias across countries do not aﬀect concentration.
The positive implication of our results are that the marked increase in concentration
in the military sectors of the US and the EU can be explained by a increase in openness
and the increased importance of the external sector of arms importers. To some extent
this also helps to explain concentration trends in the pharmaceutical industry as well.
The normative implication is that there may well be signiﬁcant gains from procurement
coordination in these sectors in, for example, the EU context.
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Figure 3: Number of Firms per Country as w increases: Non-Cooperation com-
pared with Cooperation.
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Figure 4: Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Procurement and World Market
Prices as w increases.














































Figure 5: Components of Output per Firm in the Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
as w increases.





























Figure 6: Loss of Utility: Cooperation compared with Non-Cooperation as w
increases.
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Figure 7: Number of Firms per Country as Φ increases: Non-Cooperation com-
pared with Cooperation.







































E world market price
non−cooperative procurement  price
cooperative procurement  price
Figure 8: Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Procurement and World Market
Prices as Φ increases.










































Figure 9: Components of Output per Firm in the Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
as Φ increases.





























Figure 10: Loss of Utility: Cooperation compared with Non-Cooperation as Φ
increases.































Figure 11: Stochastic Realizations of Integral Firm Numbers with Random F.































Figure 12: Stochastic Realizations of The International Price, P, with Random
F.
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